Abstracts and Biographies

Panel 1: Preparing Navies

**Gareth Cole**  
*The Office of Ordnance and the Supply of arms to the Royal Navy, 1780-1815*

**Abstract**  
This paper explores how the Office of Ordnance improved the quality of the weaponry it supplied to the Royal Navy following the American Revolutionary War. Following numerous complaints about the quality of stores, and even debates in Parliament, the Ordnance was forced to improve matters. This paper will focus on two main items, gunpowder and iron Ordnance, and will demonstrate how, with the introduction of military inspectorates as well as the appointment of two experts in their respective fields to head the newly re-organised departments, by the outbreak of war in 1793 the navy was beginning to be better armed than ever before. The roles of Sir William Congreve and Sir Thomas Blomefield cannot be over-stated in this matter. That these improvements began in a time of retrenchment and on peacetime budgets is even more remarkable.

The task was by no means complete by 1793 and this paper will describe how the improvements continued throughout the Wars with Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars. The numerous complaints had become a trickle by the end of the century and had died out completely by the end of the Napoleonic Wars. By 1815 the navy could have the confidence in its powder and cannon that it had never had before.

**Biography**  
Gareth Cole graduated from the University of Exeter in 2008 with a PhD in Maritime History. He had previously gained an MA in Naval History and BA in History at Exeter. He currently works for University of Exeter library whilst continuing his research into the navy and the Ordnance of the Napoleonic period. Although focussing primarily on the years 1793-1815 he is beginning to work on the longer period of 1780-1830. He is also the web editor of the Society for Nautical Research.

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**Hiraku Yabuki**  
*Precursor to Fisher’s reforms: A perspective from China and Australia Stations, 1901-1904*

**Abstract**  
British naval policy in the early 20th century has been studied with much focus on Sir John A. Fisher, the First Sea Lord 1904-10 and 1914-15. He had been accredited with reforms introduced during his term of office, such as the redistribution of the fleet, nucleus crew system, scrapping of smaller ships, etc. Essentially he is understood to be the man who built the modern navy which fought in the First World War.

However, he was not the only person who intended to reform and modernise the Royal Navy in the early 20th century. Politicians were quicker to face the reality of financial limitations, but some naval officers also began to formulate new ideas in the communication with the politicians. The negotiations with colonial governments also affected the Admiralty’s views how the colonies
would contribute to the maintenance of British naval supremacy. Indeed, there were quite a lot of discussions on reforms before Fisher took office as First Sea Lord on 20 October 1904.

This paper will attempt to review to what extent Fisher can be accredited with the originality of his reforms, by looking into the previous discussions on reforms among the Admiralty and the Commanders-in-Chief of the China and Australia Stations. Two reforms will be especially analysed: the redistribution of the fleet which concentrated battleships to European waters and the nucleus crews system which enabled maintaining an efficient reserve force with less costs and personnel.

**Biography**
Hiraku Yabuki is a PhD Candidate at the Department of War Studies, King’s College London. Previously he was an Affiliated Researcher at the department (2007-8) and a Research Fellow at the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science (2006-8). He holds BA and MA degrees in History from the University of Tokyo, Japan. A student of Anglo-Japanese naval relations in the early 20th century, his doctoral research concerns British naval policy in East Asia and the Pacific, 1901-14. His articles have been published in *War in History* and Japanese journals.

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**Marcus Faulkner**
*The B-Dienst and the Kriegsmarine: Organization and role of signals intelligence within the German navy during the interwar period, 1919-1939*

**Abstract**
The *Kriegsmarine*’s signals intelligence service, the *B-Dienst*, was instrumental in shaping operations during the battles for Norway and France in the spring and summer of 1940. In the ensuing Battle of the Atlantic Germany dominated the war in the ether until 1943 and thus allowed Admiral Karl Dönitz to make greater use of his limited resources to attack British seaborne commerce. Although the superiority of the *B-Dienst* in the first half of the war is generally accepted, the origins of this development remain unexplained. This paper explores the evolution of German naval signals intelligence and cryptographic efforts prior to 1939 and challenges the prevailing historical view that the *Kriegsmarine* had little interest in this new form of intelligence gathering. It will outline the *B-Dienst*’s organizational development and place within the naval staff to demonstrate that the navy’s leadership understood the importance of this intelligence source. The second part of the paper examines the work and intelligence yield of the *B-Dienst*, which by the end of the 1930s was successfully breaking and regularly reading all important foreign naval codes. Finally the paper will briefly address the importance of signals intelligence to decision-making in the *Kriegsmarine*. It concludes that German successes in the early stages of the Second World War were the result of two decades of methodical preparation.

**Biography**
Dr. Marcus Faulkner is a recent PhD graduate of the Department of War Studies King’s College London where he continues to work as a part-time lecturer. The title of his thesis was ‘Intelligence, Policy and the *Kriegsmarine* in the Interwar Period’. His main interest is the development of seapower throughout the twentieth century with particular emphasis on the impact of technology and intelligence on decision making. Currently he is completing a number of projects stemming from his thesis as well as commencing work on a new project examining the origins and development of naval signals intelligence internationally.
Panel 2: Manning Navies

Samantha Cavell
*From Shortage to Surplus: Crisis in the Creation of Young Officers, 1790-1815*

**Abstract**

On a single day in November, 1790 the Admiralty created one hundred and fifty new lieutenants, roughly half of the total number of commissions awarded that year. It was a desperate response to an apparently desperate situation as the Spanish threat loomed large over Nootka Sound, emphasizing the dearth of Royal Navy officers after nearly seven years of peace. Within a few short years, however, the reality of officer recruitment and promotion became horribly clear. The Admiralty’s reaction to the threat of war, combined with the decentralized system of recruitment and advancement for young gentlemen, exacerbated the glut of officer aspirants for whom there would never be enough lieutenancies to go around. By 1815 the problem of oversupply in the pre-commission ratings was dire. The Admiralty’s response to the new conditions of peace was drastic and resulted in the first decisive measures being implemented to centralize the recruitment and advancement of officer trainees. It was a reaction that would have lasting effects on young gentlemen and captains alike - consolidating the power of the Lords Commissioners and giving them the authority to decide who walked the Royal Navy’s quarterdecks during the nineteenth century and beyond.

**Biography**

Sam is in the final stages of her PhD in Naval History at the University of Exeter. Her focus is on the social history of young gentlemen and officer aspirants in the Royal Navy of the late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth centuries. Most recently Sam has delivered papers at the National Maritime Museum, Greenwich and the New Researchers in Maritime History Conference. She was a recipient of the Exeter Research Scholarship from 2007 to 2009.

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Daniel K. Benjamin
*Golden Harvest: The British Naval Prize System, 1793-1815*

**Abstract**

I construct a twenty percent random sample of all prizes taken by the British navy during the Great Wars of 1793-1815. I show that prizes and prize money remained plentiful until 1814. I confirm that frigates were lucrative postings, but also that third rate ships had high annual earnings.

For flag and commanding officers, prize earnings exceeded monthly wages, often by vast amounts. Prize money was a modest supplement to the incomes of lieutenants and midshipmen, but the real promise lay in potential earnings if command were achieved. The prospect of substantial prize money gave warrant and petty officers strong incentives to maintain ties with the navy. For many seamen, the prize system rarely offered much more than an occasional debauch ashore.

For the Navy – and thus the Crown – the system had three attractions. By supplementing wages, prize money directly reduced the costs of warfare. Moreover, when warships were captured rather than sunk, they could be added to the fleet. But perhaps most importantly, by tying pay to performance and responsibility, the prize system offered officers and men the incentive to act much as though they were the King Himself.
Biography

Daniel K. Benjamin is Alumni Distinguished Professor and Professor of Economics at Clemson University and Senior Fellow at the Property and Environment Research Center (PERC). He has taught at the University of Washington and the University of California, and has been a National Fellow at Stanford University. He has served as visiting professor at the University of Liverpool and at Cardiff University, and in 2004-5 was the Caird Honorary Research Fellow at the National Maritime Museum, Greenwich. His work on the economic history of the Royal Navy has been published in the Journal of Economic History and Explorations in Economic History.

Jeremiah R. Dancy

A New Look at Naval Impressment: Myths and Reality of Royal Navy Manpower, 1793-1801

Abstract

British Naval manning during the French Revolutionary Wars is worth analysing in detail because the Royal Navy’s success at sea greatly relied on its ability to procure the necessary manpower to manoeuvre and fight ships that made up the island nation’s ‘wooden walls.’ Manning sail driven warships made it necessary to find experienced men who possessed the necessary skills, strength, and agility essential to work in a ship’s rigging. Finding these men proved to be one of the most difficult tasks of waging war at sea during the era of sail. The historiography of naval manning shows a brutal and degrading task, where press gangs dragged landsmen to sea. It shows a violent ramble of men from the dregs of society as the representation of the Royal Navy’s lower deck.

This paper will look at the actual statistics of naval conscription from 1793 to 1801 and compare it to the current historiography. Examining these statistics shows that manning the fleet was not done by haphazardly pressing unskilled landsmen, malcontents, and criminals into the Royal Navy. Though conscription was a great necessity, statistics do not show a fleet comprising mostly pressed men, but rather a majority of volunteers. Had the Royal Navy been manned in the chaotic and indiscriminate manner suggested by the historiography, it would never have been able to sustain complex blockades of major French naval ports, nor would it have likely seen the success it did in battle during the last great wars of the age-of-sail.

Biography

Jeremiah R. Dancy is currently reading a DPhil in history at the University of Oxford. After four and a half years in the United States Marine Corps, Jeremiah received a BA in History from Appalachian State University, in North Carolina, followed by a MA in Naval History from the University of Exeter. Presently his research looks at Royal Navy manning during the French Revolutionary Wars, 1793-1801.

Panel 3: Thinking Navies

Gabriela Frei

The Influence of International Maritime Law on Naval Strategic Thinking in Great Britain, 1870-1890

Abstract

Political, economic, technological factors had a prominent place in the debate on naval strategic thinking in Great Britain in the second half of the nineteenth century. Yet, one further factor
occurs frequently in the debate on Britain’s future naval strategy: international law. Since the implementation of the Declaration of Paris in 1856, its provisions became a recurrent issue inside and outside parliament, particularly in context of Britain’s role in future maritime conflict.

This paper will examine the impact of law of the sea on naval strategic thinking in Great Britain during the period from 1870 to 1890. It will show that the reflections on constraints of war at sea opened up a debate on the capability and use of naval forces in future maritime conflict. Focusing particularly on the debate in the Royal United Service Institution, my analysis will illustrate further how this debate shaped the theoretical reflection on future naval warfare, in which particularly the idea of control of the sea was elaborated.

Biography
Gabriela is currently a Greendale Scholar at Merton College, reading for a DPhil in history at the University of Oxford. She earned a MPhil degree in history, a MA degree in constitutional law, and a BA degree in English literature from the University of Berne (Switzerland). After the completion of her studies she worked there as a teaching and research assistant. Most recently she was a fellow of the summer seminar in military history at the United States Military Academy, West Point, N.Y. in 2009.

Greg Kennedy

Friend or Foe: Britain’s Assessment of the United States as a Naval Power, 1904-14

Abstract

British appreciations of American maritime power before 1914 are often seen through two prisms. One model describes that British assessment as being one of rivalry and competition, with the dominant Royal Navy being concerned over the industrial and technical potential of the United States to produce a first-class navy of significant size and power to threaten British interests in the Americas. This perception of threat, rising American, German, Russian and French naval power, is often portrayed as a possible reason for a gathering of the far-flung RN squadrons from the Indian and Pacific Oceans to Atlantic and Home waters in the first two decades of the twentieth century. The second interpretation of American maritime power is that of distain, of the mighty RN being unconcerned with American naval power due to its lack of hulls, technological knowhow, and public will to sustain a serious investment in naval arms production.

This paper will argue that both of these approaches are wrong and that the British assessment of American maritime power was primarily an industrial and economic assessment, with little to do with naval power in its singular form, and that it was an appreciation of the role of America as an ally or at best benevolent neutral that was the dominant theme in British strategic considerations of American maritime power in the period from 1900-1914.

Biography

Greg Kennedy is a Professor of Strategic Foreign Policy at the Defence Studies Department, King’s College London, based at the Joint Services Command and Staff College in Shrivenham. His latest books are: Imperial Defence: The Old World Order, 1856-1956, (Routledge, 2008); and with Andrew Dorman, War and Diplomacy, From World War I to the War on Terrorism, (Potomac Books, 2008).
**Arrigo Velicogna**  
*Road to Failure: Imperial Japanese Navy tactics, technology and doctrine, 1918-1940*

**Abstract**

More often than the idea of battleships after Jutland was that of a relic of the past and the time and resources spent on them between world war one and world war two a waste of resource and the product of conservative minded admirals. The Imperial Japanese Navy is often quoted as the prime example of this waste. Their fixation on the decisive gunnery battle is the typical example of this.

Yet the Imperial Japanese Navy was an organization keen to technological development and open re-evaluating its doctrine. It was rational and logical even if the outcome of its choices wasn’t always good. The purpose of this paper is to describe the essential technical and doctrinal choices made by the Imperial Japanese Navy in the interwar years, especially its quest to outrange the enemy. These choices were not shaped by conservative thinking, but by a rational approach. The Yamato class represent the final product of this path and not an aberration. Yet the outcome of this process was in part a failure because it created a primacy of tactics and technology above strategy resulting in weapon systems effective only very few situations.

**Biography**

Arrigo Velicogna is currently a PhD Candidate at King’s College London. He holds an MA in War Studies with Merit (King’s College London) and a Degree in Ancient History (Laurea in Storia, Indirizzo Antico, Università degli Studi Alma Mater Studiorum, Bologna). His research interests include world war two and post-war conflict in East Asia and conflict simulation. He recently published a simulation on the siege of An Loc (Vietnam, April-June 1972).

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**Panel 4: Peace Keeping Navies**

**Britt Zerbe**  
*The War of American Independence and the Creation of an Imperial Rapid Reaction Force*

**Abstract**

During the Age of the War of American Independence the Army was largely immobile and wedded to the garrisons they were to inhabit while the Navy lacked the skill and experience to be used in the field for prolonged periods. However in all of this there has been one organisation and its influence on events that has been over-looked, the British Marine Corps. Also even in peace-time there was the ever present fear of naval desertion on land. So a transformative mobile force needed to exist that could utilise the speed and projection of the Navy and the strength and land discipline of the Army.

I will show how the Marines were to become an imperial rapid reaction arm, used at sea to help stop smuggling or in blockade duties of the Navy. There real developmental usage was on land where they could temporarily hold territory (i.e. Falkland Islands) or help put down slave or indigenous populations that were in revolt. But the most comprehensive usage of Marines was to be in their various duties in New England from 1768-1775. These operations were to show the true potential of the Marines as an imperial rapid reaction force.

**Biography**
Britt Zerbe is currently a PhD student in the Centre of Maritime History at the University of Exeter. He has presented a number of seminars, lectures and conference papers throughout the UK and Ireland. He is currently researching the British Marine Corps from its reconstitution in 1755 till its formalisation in 1802 by being given the title Royal. Taking a departure from eighteenth century historiography by seeing the Marines as a multi-dimensional military force to help with imperial security and amphibious war-fighting.

Joshua D. Newton  
*The Royal Navy and the Atlantic Slave Trade, 1750-1775*

**Abstract**

While much attention has been given to the role of the Royal Navy in suppressing the slave trade in West African waters throughout the nineteenth century, comparatively little has been done on the history of the navy in Africa in the era prior to 1807, when slave traders could be counted among the many beneficiaries of the navy’s protection of British seaborne commerce. This paper examines the relationship between the navy and the British slave trading industry for the half-century preceding abolition. It focuses the connection between the navy and the Company of Merchants Trading to Africa, which succeeded the moribund Royal African Company in 1750 as the public face of the British slave trading industry, administering a chain of forts and settlements largely concentrated in the Gambia and the Gold Coast. While the African coast remained a peripheral theatre of naval operations, the support and participation of the navy was central to the maintenance of the British slaving infrastructure. It explores the relationship between the navy and the slave trade in both a geopolitical sphere and in the realm of on-station encounters in Africa. Drawing on company records, both metropolitan and African, as well as rich and virtually unexamined naval accounts of African voyages, the paper takes up the contrasting nature of the navy’s peacetime and wartime roles in Africa, looking especially at naval intervention in disputes with the French and Dutch companies that occurred prior to the outbreak of the Seven Years’ War and in the period between the peace of 1763 and the outbreak of the American Revolution.

**Biography**

Originally hailing from San Francisco, Joshua Newton completed his undergraduate degree in History at Reed College in Portland, Oregon, where his thesis explored the politics of the loss of Minorca in 1756 and the subsequent trial and execution of John Byng. He then moved across the Atlantic to the University of Exeter for a master’s degree. His dissertation, supervised by N. A. M. Rodger, looked at the Earl Temple’s tenure as first lord of the Admiralty under the Pitt-Devonshire Ministry. In 2008, he was awarded the John Sperling Studentship for doctoral study at King’s College, Cambridge. His PhD examines the role of sea power in the transatlantic slave trade from the mid-eighteenth century heyday of the trade to the early suppression period following abolition in 1807.

Howard J. Fuller  
*'As amiable as invincible': Ironclad-Monitor U.S.S. Monadnock, Naval Power-Politics & the Spanish Bombardment of Valparaiso, 1866*

**Abstract**

We don’t know whether naval ‘supremacy’ preserves peace—or provokes war. In this mid-19th-century case-study, Spanish power-projection against South America succeeded in galvanising a military alliance between Chile, Peru, Ecuador and Bolivia. Leading the Spanish task force was the formidable armoured frigate, Numancia, against which neither allied navy had
anything to compare. The entire Pacific coast was seemingly at the mercy of Spanish Admiral Casto Méndez Núñez.

Yet bombarding undefended port-towns such as Valparaiso entailed serious international ramifications; namely the presence of U.S., French and British lives and property. Formerly on a voyage around Cape Horn to San Francisco, it was a fateful coincidence, therefore, that the double-turreted U.S.S. Monadnock soon dropped anchor at Valparaiso to enforce international neutrality, if necessary. Armed with 15-inch calibre smoothbores firing 450-pound solid shot, the American monitor, assured her commander, Civil War naval veteran Commodore John Rodgers, would leave “only the trucks of the Spanish vessel’s masts...above water, thirty minutes after the firing had commenced”. The British admiral at the scene nervously agreed. A naval showdown, however, would not settle a local peace but trigger a much wider war. With both ironclads glaring at one another across the bay, the diplomats furiously set to work. Núñez was meanwhile obliged to carry out his orders eventually (which he finally did on 31 March), while Rodgers could only write to his father-in-law that the U.S. government would surely “know when we should meddle—I have no latent desire to play first fiddle.”

Utilising in-depth archival sources on both sides of the Atlantic, this paper explores how a major war was indeed avoided, and international legal norms at the time were preserved, but at the direct expense of a heavily-populated civilian target. Did the threat of foreign (naval) intervention in the Latin American quarrel aggravate the situation, or deter further ‘outrages’?

Biography
Howard J. Fuller completed his BA in History at the Ohio State University and his MA and PhD at King's College, London. In 2002 he was awarded the Hayes Fellowship in U.S. Naval History the Naval Historical Center in Washington, D.C. Since 2005 Dr. Fuller has been Senior Lecturer of War Studies at the University of Wolverhampton, Associate Professor of History at the University of Maryland University College, and is Associate Editor for The International Journal of Naval History. He is the author of Clad in Iron: The American Civil War and the Challenge of British Naval Power (2008), which was awarded Honorable Mention for the John Lyman Book Award in U.S. Naval History last year, and which has recently been re-published in paperback by the U.S. Naval Institute Press. He is currently editing an international work on power-projection issues of the Pax Britannica, and, thanks to a recent sabbatical, completing a history of Great Britain’s early ironclad programme for Routledge.

Panel 5: Fighting Navies

Tim Voelcker
The Effectiveness of Not Using Naval Firepower

Abstract
Too much military history is concerned only with battles, other lesser actions and demonstrations of bravery. Occasions when it may have been more effective not to engage in action – to retain a ‘fleet in being’ for defence or as a threat for future use – often do not engage the interest of the general public at the time or of later historians.

Admiral Saumarez’ five years in HMS Victory as C-in-C of a large Baltic fleet from 1808-12 are an outstanding example. After an initial skirmish which sent the Russian fleet scurrying into port
for safety, he turned diplomat and by his restraint in his use of force except in defence of vital British trade in and out of the Baltic, broke Napoleon’s Continental System by maintaining a British naval presence where it should have been impossible. He had few instructions from the Admiralty and what he had he sometimes chose to ignore.

Yet today he is largely forgotten and even in his own time, he only received the peerage he richly deserved twenty years after the event and not long before his death.

**Biography**

Following National Service in the Royal Navy where he was commissioned, Tim Voelcker took up an Open Scholarship in History at Peterhouse, Cambridge. Graduating in 1955, he held jobs as Outward Bound Instructor, Training Officer in a steelworks in S.Wales, and then had 15 years in the brewing industry, ending as Wines & Spirits Marketing Director of a large London company. He left to create own small pub and restaurant group which evolved into a wine merchant's business that was sold in a management buy-out in 2000. This enabled him to commence part-time research for a PhD at the University of Exeter under Professor N.A.M.Rodger, while continuing to work as a Wine Consultant and Lecturer - thesis subject: “From Post Captain to Diplomat: the transformation of Admiral Sir James Saumarez in the Napoleonic Wars”, which has now been extended into a book, “Admiral Saumarez versus Napoleon”. He is currently editing “Admiral Sir James Saumarez: The Private Correspondence” for the Navy Records Society, jointly with James Davey of National Maritime Museum, Greenwich.

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**Robert Johnson**

*Projecting its Strategic Power: The Royal Navy & the Anglo-Persian War, 1856-57*

**Abstract**

Britain’s strategic dilemma in the nineteenth century was how to establish security for its shipping lanes and territorial possessions when its primary arm for power projection was the navy. The defence of India’s landward frontiers presented the Royal Navy with a particular problem. There were concerns that a small British and Indian Army might be overwhelmed by Russia, while Persia was in danger of falling under Russian control. Consequently Britain exercised strategic ‘leverage’ against Persia by amphibious operations in 1856-7, concurrently neutralising the Shah’s own ambitions to annex western Afghanistan. Contrary to the heroic contemporary reports of the mid-nineteenth century, or the denigrating scholarship in the twentieth century (which sought to portray the Anglo-Persian War as one of a string of disasters from the Crimea to the Indian Mutiny), this paper offers a reappraisal of the conflict by revisiting the archival records. The focus of the paper is the naval operations which, whilst not without problems, were crucial to the overall success of the campaign. This short war in the Persian Gulf occurred at the junction between the age of steam and the age of sail, and, as such, offers a fascinating glimpse of the Royal Navy on operations in a period of rapid transformation, and, more crucially, its strategic value.

**Biography**

Dr Rob Johnson is the Deputy Director of the Oxford Changing Character of War Programme, and Lecturer in the History of War and Strategic Studies at the University of Oxford. His primary research interests are wars in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Persia-Iran, and Mesopotamia/Iraq including naval and land operations, irregular warfare, counter-insurgency, intelligence and strategy. He teaches more broadly on the History of War. He is currently working on a new history of The Iran-Iraq War. His recent publications include *Spying for Empire: The Great Game in Central and South Asia 1757-1947*, (London: Greenhill, 2006).
Holger Afflerbach
'Sinking with Flying Colours?' Surrender in European Navies from Elizabethan to Our Times.

Abstract
When do soldiers decide to surrender? Clausewitz thought that soldiers should surrender if they were no longer able to harm the enemy. But sometimes soldiers choose death in preference to surrender.

A rigid code of honour, and institutional and peer pressure can lead soldiers to this point. My article will show that in European navies there developed a code of not surrendering, but of preferring to sink ‘with flying colours.’ My analysis begins with Grenville and the ‘Revenge’ and his refusal to surrender but I will show that in the times of wooden sailing ships the refusal to surrender was not the norm, but it was an ideal. The real turning point was the 19th century. Fighting conditions changed dramatically, but the naval code of honour didn’t adapt to these technical developments. Therefore in both World Wars we see an orgy of refusals to surrender. Hundreds of sailing ships surrendered in the times between Grenville and Nelson but the number of ships surrendering in both World Wars was minimal. The very few commanders who surrendered became ostracized.

My paper will show that a soldierly code of honour can become a death trap even in a culture which allows surrender, and this begs comparison with Japanese kamikaze tactics. An analysis of the sinking of selected fighting units in World War II in Europe and Japan will prove that there were minimal practical differences between deliberate Japanese suicide missions and the European refusal to surrender.

Biography
Holger Afflerbach is Professor at the University of Leeds. From 2002-2006 he was DAAD Professor of History at Emory University. Afflerbach specializes in late nineteenth and twentieth Century German history; international relations; military history, particularly World War I and World War II; and Austrian and Italian history. Among his publications are the biography of the Prussian War Minister and Chief of General Staff Erich von Falkenhayn (Munich 1994, second edition 1996); his study of the Triple Alliance, entitled Der Dreibund. Europäische Grossmacht und Allianzpolitik vor dem Ersten Weltkrieg (Vienna 2002); and a popular book on the history of the Atlantic published under the title Das entfesselte Meer (Munich, 2002). He also edited an edition of sources from the German Headquarters in World War I under the title Kaiser Wilhelm II: als Oberster Kriegsherr während des Ersten Weltkrieges – Quellen aus der militärischen Umgebung des Kaisers (Munich, 2005).